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The review of the four intergovernmental
organizations, or IGOs (European Union
[EU], World Trade Organization [WTO],
World Health Organization [WHO], and
North American Free Trade Agreement
[NAFTA]) confirms the correlation
between the level of integration, on the
one hand, and the intensity of the
discourse on the democracy-legitimacy
deficit, on the other. In an organization
where the rule of consensus prevails and
the area of activity is essentially technical
and relies on "independent" experts, the
discourse does not arise or is muted. The
debate about the WHO, confined
generally to elites of experts and
bureaucrats, is an appropriate example. At
the point, however, where the member
states become subject to majority vote and
the organization's competence is broad
enough to require the setting of priorities
and mediation between conflicting
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interests and values, the level of
discourse in democratic societies rises,
and becomes linked to a more general
debate on reforming the organization.
This is what has happened in the
evolving EU. In the WTO, the discourse
originated in the use of the adjudicatory
power of the institution.
Propelled by the search for assured
reciprocity, adjudication procedures have
formed the vanguard in the path toward
closer integration, offering legitimacy as
an aspect of the rule of law. In the WTO,
the NAFTA, and the European Union,
however, the transfer of judicial power to
international institutions raises questions
of conformity with the national
constitutions of the member states.
Moreover, the scope of review of national
legislation by the adjudicatory organs
creates a potential conflict between the
acts of the organization and the national

law of a member state that reflects
competing values. The potential for such
conflict is enhanced markedly if the issue
may be raised directly by a concerned
individual or firm. Where, as illustrated
by the European Community, some law
of the international organization becomes
directly applicable and enforceable in the
domestic law of a member state, the rule
of law (and legitimacy) is enhanced, but
this system standing alone cannot cure
the democracy gap without incorporating
political institutions that fit the idea of
democracy. More generally, where normmaking facilities are not keeping pace,
disproportionate reliance on non-elected
adjudicatory bodies fans the democracylegitimacy discourse. This proved to be a
problem in the early decades of the
European Community and some see it as
an emerging challenge in the WTO.
In searching for remedies to the
democracy-legitimacy deficit, one would
logically look to the practice within the
modern democratic states, as varied as
this may be. Yet.any such model of
governance is obviously not transferable
to the international level and
idiosyncratic solutions are therefore
required to fit a discrete organization. It
has been suggested that the very idea of
democracy needs to be redefined for this
purpose, but to my knowledge no
general theory has emerged so far.
One controversial idea would eschew
representative democracy in international
institutions such as the WTO and instead
pursue the civic republican ("participatory")
approach based on institutional balance,
broad deliberation, and consensus,
bolstered by open access to policymaking
for interest groups and individual
standing to litigate claims before tribunals.
The question is - as the varied interests
become increasingly affected - whether
ultimately this system could perform the
essential mediatory function of a
representative democracy.
In pursuing the principles of
representative democracy, two remedies
are sought: in the national procedures of
the member states and/or at the
international level in the structure and
functioning of the particular organization.
As demonstrated by the EU experience,
those who see the member states not just
as privileged actors but as "masters" of
the organization would seek to improve
representation and accountability
through national parliaments. This
solution is likely to be the inclination of

the "neo-realists," "neo-functionalists,"
and "intergovernmentalists" of diverse
hues. On the other hand, those who
view the organization as a multilevel
governance regime, in which the
member states wield significant influence
in a complex process with a wide range
of participants, would advocate more
power for the elected European
Parliament of the EU. Thus, a dialectic
tension exists, although both alternatives
may be usefully pursued.
At the national level, experience has
shown that the legitimacy of a state's
adhesion to an IGO, grounded in the act
of approval by an elected legislature,
dissipates quickly as the national
delegation, appointed and instructed by
the national executive, often acts within
the organization in alliance with other
delegations and IGO staff, and finds itself
with little actual supervision by, or
accountability to, the national legislature.
Several suggestions to reduce this
deficiency have been advanced in the
discourse:
■ Members of the legislature and
representatives of the private sector
should participate in the negotiations
for the constituent treaty and any
major amendments, allowing space
for confidential bargaining by the
executive alone. Similar representation
should be assured in the process of
domestic implementation of the
constituent treaty and acts of the
organization. National referenda on
appropriate major issues before an
international institution may be useful
in democratic states.
■ An ample flow of information from
the national delegation to the
legislature is a prerequisite to effective
supervision A special legislative
committee should be charged with
this task. Contacts between national
legislatures and the all-membership
organs of the organization should be
encouraged, including common
sessions ("assizes" in the European
Union).
■ Even in those national orders that do
not confer direct effect on treaties, the
domestic courts of the member state
should interpret national law in
accordance with the state's obligations
under the constituent treaty and the
rules adopted by the international
organization.
All of these ideas deserve serious
consideration. Some have been adopted,
such as the procedure for the

implementation of the NAFTA in the
United States and the special legislative
committees in some member states of the
European Union. The referendum route
may not be practicable if complex texts
are to be put before poorly informed
voters or deeply fractured constituencies.
Care must be taken as well that
intervention by national legislatures is
not carried so far as to impair the
working of the international institution.
Despite their usefulness, national
procedures alone can hardly be expected
to meet the democracy-legitimacy
requirement appropriate to the
integration level of an IGO. Measures
must also be sought at the level of the
organization:
■ Most sessions of the institutions,
particularly rule-making sessions,
should be open to the public and
documents, including draft proposals,
should be placed on the Internet.
■ In organizations at higher levels of
integration, a standing consultative
body composed of members of
national parliaments might be
established to assure greater
accountability.
■ Actual decision-making should not be
confined to major powers acting in a
club-like setting; the broad
membership should have an
opportunity for genuine participation.
■ Nongovernmental organizations and
interest groups should be given
adequate and fair access to the
institutions for exchange of data and
consultation. A normative framework
should be devised for such
participation.
■ An inspection panel (such as that
created by the World Bank) and an
ombudsman should be appointed to
receive citizen complaints of maladministration.
■ At low integration levels such as that
of the WHO, remedial measures
should focus on transparency,
openness to the outside world,
accountable and effective
management, and policy results that
gain the constituency's acceptance.
■ Some of the discrete features of the
European Union may be transferable
to international institutions, such as
phased development, the vigorous use
of institutional powers, the
ombudsman mentioned above, the
procedures and precedent building of
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the EU judiciary, the consultation
system and advisory organs, measures
to improve transparency, cooperation
with national parliaments, and depending on the level of integration the efforts to advance the sense of
common good and expectations. In
principle, however, the transfer of any
feature of one organization to another
succeeds only if the basic contexts of
both are roughly comparable.
■ Particularly at a higher level of
integration, dispersion of the
organization's central power should be
sought through reliance on regional
and local authorities, and the
principle of subsidiarity should be
honored. Both regionalism and
subsidiarity should be kept in mind in
connection with all international
institutions since only those powers
that are necessary to deal with
international problems should be
centralized in IGOs.
■ In the interest of legitimacy, if for no
other reasons, IGOs and regimes
should explore the ways of protecting
the core of fundamental human rights
within the confines of their
competence.
Several observations regarding this list
are in order. The new information
technology, including the Internet, has
already contributed to greater
transparency and to enhancing the role
of NGOs. A major problem has been
finding a way to open up the preparatory
proceeding that precedes final action,
while protecting genuinely confidential
information and allowing space for
confidential bargaining. The protesters
against the WTO "club system" of
decision making included not only
NGOs but also government delegates
from less developed countries - a signal
to the WTO establishment. Generally,
NGOs play a useful role, provided that
they shun violence and are themselves
democratic in their organization and
transparent in respect of their
constituency, internal proceedings, and
sources of funding.
Some participants in the discourse see
the currently feasible measures as
palliatives. They believe that nothing
short of a radical restructuring of the
international and regional systems can
cure the democracy-legitimacy gap.
Thus, in the WTO, private individuals
and firms are to replace the member
governments as the principal actors. In
the European Union, voices in the
judiciary and high political circles call for
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a federation (often not meaningfully
defined) based on a European
constitution as the only effective remedy.
All of these "radical" measures are
designed to inject the voice of individual
citizens into the exclusively state-based
structures. This could be accomplished
in two major ways. First, individuals
could be recognized as stakeholders with
individual rights derived from the
constituent treaty and broadly enforceable
by the domestic or supranational judiciary.
A less intrusive alternative would be to
enable a private party to pursue a specific
claim in an arbitration proceeding, as in
the NAFTA chapter on investment. In
this context, I have noted the vital
differences between the European Union
and the WTO, which at this stage of
integration make transfers of the basic
features of the European Union difficult
to envision.
A second avenue toward broadening
citizen participation would enlarge the
structure by adding an assembly, elected
directly by the people in the member
states, with powers to recommend norms
and policy; such an assembly would
eventually replace the organs of general
membership represented by states and
obtain lawmaking powers. As
globalization progresses and democracy
spreads worldwide, a "cosmopolitan"
democracy could make possible - so
goes the argument - the direct election
by universal suffrage of a Global Peoples
Assembly, with general competence to
legislate where worldwide action is called

for and to coordinate the work of
international institutions.
History has taught us not to
underestimate the power of utopia. Too
often in the past it has proved difficult to
foresee a systemic change that would
tum a utopian vision into what Richard
Falk has called a "political project." But
some of the ideas adumbrated in this
section, especially the world legislature,
postulate a radical transformation of the
present intemationai system. As
international integration advances, new
actors - intergovernmental, subgovemmental, and nongovernmental have appeared on the international
scene; their number and influences on
the behavior of states have grown over
the last few decades and hold "the
potential [for] spillover of democratic
practices." However, in view of the
enormous differences in the size,
population, and powers of states (which
are not about to fade away) , as well as
the persistent, deep-rooted differences in
the peoples - cultural-ethnic, economic,
and political - there is little evidence
that the democracy-legitimacy gap can be
filled by "Great and Desperate Cures," at
the global level at any rate. On the other
hand, there is ample evidence that
creative, idiosyncratic arrangements
commensurate with the respective level
of integration are called for in both the
national and the international institutions
to address the deficit problem.
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